



EASILY the most significant development of legal science in the
United States during the past half century has been the Copernican
discovery that law is a practical science. Or in other words, that law
is not merely a static philosophy of justice enshrined in learned tradi-
tion but a dynamic enterprise of social control.
This conception has motivated the outstanding efforts to improve the
content of the system of legal education. Most immediately, it im-
plies recognition, on the one hand, of the critical importance of legis-
lation as the chief modem technique for the determination and defi-
nition of social objectives and, on the other hand, of the crucial rele-
vance to justice of the nature and effectiveness of the processes em-
ployed to realize the mandates of social policy. It further requires, as
a basis for the critique of prevalent values and current procedures, the
accumulation of adequate, validated, and pertinent information con-
cerning the actual operation and effects of the administration of
justice, as well as with regard to the living law and the economic,
political, or social activities which the law purports to coordinate or
control. Ultimately, as a means to compensate for local or ephemeral,
national or cultural, biases, the conception of law as a means to attain
social ends paves the way to an objective, humanistic scheme of legal
science, to which the phenomena relating to the functioning of law in
all times and places may be relevant. For, in the last analysis, the
pragmatic approach is scientific, rather than traditional, dogmatic, or
provincial, in outlook.
This expansion of the scope of legal education and legal science be-
yond the ancient boundaries of authoritative doctrine has in recent
years fostered new philosophical perspectives, stimulated a variety of
ventures in legal research, and, most conspicuously, occasioned a
multiplication of more comprehensive casebooks to represent the
enlarged subject matter in legal instruction. In this, growing, if not
yet entirely adequate, attention has been focused upon the existent or
possible procedures of the legal process in legislation and the adminis-
tration of justice. In addition, there has come increased appreciation
of the intimate relations between law and the other social sciences, but
the tentative essays that have been made to establish lines of com-
munication have as yet scarcely bridged the chasm that historically
divides jurisprudence from social science. On the other hand, com-
parative legal studies, the significance of which has been latent in the
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burgeoning conception of legal science, have lagged. It remained for
the last world war, exploding the myth of insularism and vastly ex-
tending the international commitments of the United States, to lift
the horizon of interest in American legal education appreciably be-
yond the frontiers of national institutions, conceptions, and problems.
From this point of view, the two-way program recently inaugurated at
the Yale Law School presages a more cosmopolitan attitude in the
law schools.
While the need to adapt the legal system of the United States to the
social and economic requirements of the modem world was most
persuasively reflected, at least for the past generation, in the so-
ciological jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound, undoubtedly the primary
credit for the progressive efforts that have been made to reform the
historically oriented legal curriculum of thirty years ago in the light
of this need belongs elsewhere. It was at the outset no light enterprise
to convince the conservative law school community that legislation is
a vital subject for legal study; that not alone legal doctrine but also its
effective operation must be considered in legal instruction; that
corresponding attention must be given to the practical aspects of
judicial procedure and administrative law; that the interrelations
between law and business practice, between legal and other social
sciences, must be explored; that complementary comparative legal in-
quiries and notably actualistic studies to fill in the wide gaps in the
available knowledge of the operation of the legal system, should be
encouraged; in fine, that the study of law in the university law schools
should be raised to a level of scientific activity comparable to that
in other departments of education. The accomplishment of these
objectives-which are even yet by no means adequately realized or
even accepted in all quarters-was initially, due to the enlightened
conviction and courageous persistence of a small group of legal scholars
who in the 1920's launched the first comprehensive survey of the legal
curriculum at the Columbia University Law School, an event which
catalyzed the progressive efforts that have since been made there and
elsewhere, abortively at The Johns Hopkins University, more effec-
tively at the Yale Law School, and eventually in an increasing number
of other institutions, to develop legal research and to provide a more
modem and realistic system of legal education.
In this group, specifically concerned about the actual effects of law
and profoundly imbued with the open-minded spirit of scientific in-
quiry, Underhill Moore was outstandingly influential. It was my good
fortune to make his acquaintance during the period of curricular dis-
cussion at Columbia and thereafter as occasion offered to observe his
rare qualities as a friend and as a student of law, his unfailing interest
in legal education, his courageous convictions, and particularly the
objective operation of his highly incisive and widely informed lawyer
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like mind. It is but just on this occasion to record the leading part that
by virtue of these qualities he played in the critical stages of the move-
ment to liberalize legal education in the United States, to which ref-
erence has been made, no less than his "fierce" devotion to legal edu-
cation and his unflinching integrity as a legal scholar. For him, the
results of careful research were their own best justification.
This integrity underlay the painstaking efforts that Underhill
Moore made to establish an institutional technique for the study of
the problems of law. It also explains a cardinal point in his views of
such matters, namely, that as the cause of legal education is to be
advanced by dispassionate objective inquiry, that cause may be prej-
udiced by unverified theory or irresponsible propaganda. The corre-
spondence which follows these preliminary remarks canvasses an issue
quite germane to this point, namely, the question of the relevance of
metaphysical analysis to jurisprudence. And it may be observed in
passing that the discussion is in a quasi-Socratic form that Underhil
Moore presumably might well enjoy. Although those concerned have
graciously consented to the publication of these letters, they have
preferred anonymity. Nevertheless, they do exist, although not, as
one explains, "for Descartes' reasons." One, the villain in the piece
who instigated the exchange, is a veritable arbiter elegantiarurn in
matters of law, philosophy, and art; the other is a noted professional
philosopher, who has published various recognized works in his field.
Their respective contributions to the discussion of a most serious
problem of intellectual cooperation concerning jurisprudence are
gratefully acknowledged.
CORRESPONDENCE, MAY, 1941I-JANuARY, 1942
From Y to H May 27, 1941
A copy of the current Michigan Law Review containing my "Jurispru-
dence on Parade"UT] was forwarded to you under other cover about three
[1] 39 MIcH. L. REv. 1154 (1941).
days ago. I await with apprehension the blast that may denote your ceasing
to hold your breath, and with impatient interest your general reaction.
From H to Y June 11, 1941
I sent a photostat of your paper to a friend of mine who is a professional
philosopher and who has written a number of books on metaphysics and re-
lated subjects. He replied as follows:
"I am leaving tonight for the Cape, but I just want to write you that I
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have read Yntema's article with great interest and with pleasure at find-
ing what he says about your book. He writes very well, but I am still
puzzled by his use of the term 'realism' in the earlier part of the paper.
By realism Yntema means-nominalism, e.g., page 1171, where 'law as
fact' is described as 'ultra-realistic.' He evidently means something
like actualism or materialism by the term, Of course, this is true also of
the usage of a great many modern philosophers. For example, there is
the term 'physical realism' which really means a kind of materialism or
actualism. I judge that for Yntema there are two philosophical posi-
tions with respect to jurisprudence: (1) idealism or mentalism, with
which he associates the name of Plato, and (2) 'realism', or building
upon the brute facts which we have to face in actuality. I don't find
true metaphysical realism as an alternative in his mind at all. I am
anxious to know whether I am misunderstanding the legal theorists,
which is, of course, quite possible."
I have explained to him what I thought you meant by realism, but if you
want to send me your own statement, I should be delighted to pass it on to
him.
From Y to H June 27, 1941
Second, the comment of your unnamed philosophical friend is of consider-
able interest, and I should have to grant him justice in remarking the inap-
propriateness of the term "legal realism," particularly since I have suggested
as much myself. I should not want to respond to the comment, since I am
sure that you have more than adequately done so. Moreover, on page 1156
you will find a humble effort on my part to epitomize the chief trends of the
movement, though not in philosophical terms. But I believe the thought
might be added that I don't believe that the so-called "realist" movement sig-
nificantly developed in terms of any formal philosophical position. In fact,
I should go further and allege that the realist program is quite congrous with
a nominalist theory of knowledge, with a "true metaphysical realism," with
certain species of idealism, as well as with pragmatism, if that be deemed a
philosophy. In other words, I do not apprehend that the "realist" develop-
ment derived from any specific philosophical theory of knowledge; the issue,
as I see it, was between those who conceived that the solution of legal problems is
to be found in the intuitive or logical application of general principles, evidenced
by tradition or authority, and those who asserted that in the process the so-
cial aspects of the problems which the law is called upon to solve should be
taken into account and the social policies involved and their consequences, as
well as the means of giving them effect, systematically considered. In this
persuasion, though the issue might be interpreted as one of transcendentalism
vs. non-transcendentalism, it has not, as you know, seemed to me advantageous
to analyze the situation further in epistemological terms.
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I should add only that, though there is some warrant in some of the realist
literature for your correspondent's description of "realism" as "building upon
the brute facts which we have to face in actuality," I should personally not
accept the definition, at least unless there had been a thorough understanding
as to what "brute facts" are.
From H to Y July 9, 1941
I am taking your letter with me to Nags Head where I shall ponder upon
it by the seashore. I am afraid the complexdties of the points you raise may
preclude our discussing them by correspondence. Maybe the change of en-
vironment will suggest a method of simplification. Meanwhile, I passed your
remarks in your letter of June 27th on to my philosophical friend, who replies
as follows:
"Mr. Yntema's remarks are interesting. He has two arguments in the
passage you quote, and these finally reduce to one. (1) He denies that
the realist movement in jurisprudence derives from any philosophical
position. In this I have no doubt he is correct; but he seems to have
misunderstood my comment and in so doing has fallen a victim of the
familiar error of the confusion of history with logic, more particularly,
of the confusion of that particular part of history which is psychological
history, with logic. There is not even a faint family resemblance between
the meanings of 'derived from' and 'implied by.' The realist movement
in jurisprudence did not have to be derived from philosophic nominalism
to be implied by it. For every theoretical position implies its own de-
ducibility from some metaphysics, quite irrespective of consciousness
and in fact of all history. My point was simply that the so-called realists
in jurisprudence are the equivalent of nominalists in philosophy. Since
I hold that nominalism as the whole truth, that is as the basis of an on-
tology and an epistemology, is false in philosophy, philosophy being su-
perior in the theoretical field to jurisprudence, it follows that 'realism' in
jurisprudence by deduction must be (held by me, at least), to be false as
well. This leads inevitably into a second point.
"(2) At the bottom of your first paragraph, Yntema has pointed out
that the issue is between two schools of jurisprudence; those who appeal
to an application of principles, and those who appeal to actual social prac-
tices, and is thus internal to jurisprudence. Of course it is. Every field
has internal problems which are yet related to metaphysics above and to
actual experiences below. Things can only be related which are distin-
guished; and if jurisprudence did not have its own problems which make
it in a sense independent of other fields, it would not have any real iden-
tity which could be related to other fields above and below. Any valid
field, i.e. any empirical field capable of being investigated at its ovm level,
will have to satisfy in the end both inferior practice and superior theory.
"This brings me to a last and to me most absorbing point. By stating
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the issue in jurisprudence the clear way he has, Yntema has also sug-
gested its solution. There are two chief steps in logico-scientific method:
correspondence and coherence. Correspondence is the check against
factual actuality: is the'hypothesis allowed by practice? Coherence is the
check against existing theory: is the hypothesis consistent with theory?
Those who look for legal solutions in what the court does in fact are
asking for correspondence; those who look to traditional principles are
asking for coherence. A complete demonstration can no more leave out
one step than it can leave out the other. I am not suggesting, however,
that the legal problem is as simple as this. It seems to me that the realist
legal theory as well as the others are misconceived, but since I am an ama-
teur of the rankest sort in legal theory I hesitate to say so until I can do
better (which I hope to do). Such legal correspondence is at once too
vague and too literal; such legal coherence is too naive since it seizes
upon traditional legal theory and sets that up as the legal theory when
as a matter of record it consists in a host of conflicting theories with
which no hypothesis could possibly prove itself self-consistent since it is
not self-consistent without the hypothesis.
"The sum of this argument amounts to the claim that jurisprudence is
dependent upon metaphysics as much as upon concrete experience,
whether the legal theorists admit this into their professional problems
or not, and, further, that legal theory in its conflicts bears a striking re-
semblance to the conflicts in philosophy and to scientific method in the
philosophy of science. I do not think that this philosophical approach to
jurisprudence has even been scratched. I say this despite Cohen and
others who have dabbled in it, and with all the humbleness which recog-
nizes the possibility that I may not prove to be the right philosopher for
the task. Clearly, however, somebody who has no fear of being wrong
will have to tackle the task."
From Y to H July 17, 1941
I am delighted to have your letter of the 9th, which adds a few more pages
to our conversations with the anonymous. Your intended vacation at Nags
Head excites my envy; our brief stay there at your kind suggestion reminds
me that it is a charming place. I might suggest, however, if it were not so
impertinent, that, to our recent epistolary discussion, there is a certain pro-
priety in your choosing a spot so named. I refer not to the possible banal
connotations of the genitive "Nags," but to its alleged history. Indeed, it
suggests that, in the Egyptian darkness of my philosophical innocence, you
are calculating that, by leading an anonymous stalking horse carrying a wav-
ering light along the beach, you may lure me into the epistemological shoals
which apparently abound along the North Carolina coast.
In any event, the comment you have transmitted is of no little interest.
Fox one thing, I am struck by the circumstance that your anonymous meta-
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physical counsel leads to a position which is somewhat analogous to one I
attempted to develop sometime since in the New York University Law
Quarterly Review, albeit by a path that I cannot but consider in certain re-
spects dubious and though I should prefer, as at present advised, to em-
phasize accuracy and economy of formulation rather than coherence as the
theoretical criterion of theory in law. (Indeed, in law there seems question
whether consistency of theory, except in terms sufficiently abstract to be de-
nuded of significance, should be for all purposes assumed as desirable. And,
perhaps, your notion of "disorder" as a concept to order the realm of law
might be relevant on this point.)
But, apart from the above analogy, I suppose you quite realize and not
without smug amusement that there is a rather fundamental disparity of
views. Thus, with regard to the comment on my effort to explain why I was
not interested to discuss the realist movement in philosophical terms, the ar-
gument thus far might be dialectized as follows:
Anon.: Your article is apparently philosophically naive; it does not clearly
develop the logical implications of legal realism and seems not to be
aware of the possible metaphysical positions from which realism
should be criticized.
Y.: But I don't believe that legal realism derived from any particular
philosophical credo. (Aside, sotto voce) Medoubts that the realist
movement can be significantly discussed in such terms. Can't one
have freedom in his metaphysics-be a nominalist, a critical realist,
or even a liberal-minded idealist-and still subscribe to the essential
trends of legal realism?
Anon.: You suffer from the familiar error of confusing history and logic.
There is not even a faint family resemblance between the meanings
of "derived from" and "implied by."
Thus far the dialogue has gone; presumably, my cue is:
Y.: But I was discussing "Jurisprudence on Parade." Are you suggest-
ing that the metaphysical implications of legal realism were of sub-
stantial historical significance in the development of the movement?
And the response might be constructed as follows:
Anon.: No, but I strongly suspect that legal realism is the equivalent in
jurisprudence of the heresy of nominalism in philosophy. This con-
cerns me as a philosopher, since in the theoretical field philosophy
is superior to jurisprudence.
Y.: Well, well. And I had been assuming in my essay, Aurisprudcizia
vera philosophia.
And so we come to the principal issue which induced me to take exception
some ten years ago to Morris Cohen's assaults on the effort to develop a
more "realistic" approach to legal problems, namely, the independent sig-
nificance of traditional metaphysics for legal science. The assumption, of
which I have thus far seen no adequate demonstration, that metaphysics is
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theoretically superior to jurisprudence for the purposes of jurisprudence, ap-
pears to me an anachronous vestige of the ancient claim of theology to govern
the mundane as well as the spiritual world. I am not disposed to attempt to
argue this fundamental issue in this letter, though I should perhaps add that,
in my view, speculative theory, which is of course a vital part of scientific
inquiry, is an integral, and not an independent or superior, aspect of the
scientific process.
From H to Y August 6, 1941
Here are some extracts from the most recent letter of my philosophical
friend. I hope he is not driving you into a corner.
(Enclosure)
Your copy of Yntema's letter has arrived and I have read it with much
interest. I can see in it humour and genuine graciousness, and yet, at the
same time, a slight disinclination to continue the controversy. Both elements
spur me on to get at the heart of our differences. I can share Yntema's feel-
ing that we represent divergent viewpoints: all the more reason, I think, to
state them in such a way that one of us may be able to perceive the error of
his position. For I hold of course, and I believe Yntema does also, that if
two propositions exist oil the same level of analysis and are contradictory, one
of them must be at least partly wrong.
Therefore I go on to assert that in Yntema's fanciful arrangement of our
future dialogue he has assumed for the relation of metaphysics to jurispru-
dence the necessary resolution of the problem to two mutually contradictory
and exhaustive alternatives. Apparently, in his view, either (1) jurispru-
dence is dependent upon metaphysics, or (2) jurisprudence develops inde-
pendently of metaphysics.
If so, (1), jurisprudence has no real independence. jurisprudence will
have to take what metaphysics chooses to give: whatever jurisprudence is
implied by a developed metaphysics is the proper jurisprudence of meta-
physics. Both Yntema and I reject this alternative.
, (2) On the second alternative, metaphysics has no important relevance to
jurisprudence. Metaphysics has to take what jurisprudence chooses to give.
Whatever metaphysics is implied by a developed jurisprudence is the proper
metaphysics of jurisprudence. I reject this alternative, too, but I believe that
Yntema does not.
Since he does not, my attack upon his position must include (a) an attack
upon both (1) and (2) and a rejection (b) of the presupposition that these
alternatives exhaust the possibilities, at this level.
With respect to the rejection of (1), obviously neither a proper jurispru-
dence (nor a proper anything else) can be arrived at by simple deduction
from metaphysics. This, on the grounds that we can neither guarantee
knowing the true metaphysics nor having made the true deductive steps,
That is the historical fallacy of procedure. The logico-ontological fallacy
consists in the proposition that no number of universals can yield a particular.
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In actuality, each unique thing contains something over and above the uni-
versal elements: a spatiotemporal reference, a surd, or, as Plato called it, a
receptacle, the mere fact of the togetherness in time and space of those cer-
tain universals which do compose it. Thus unique things can never be de-
duced absolutely from their universals. Jurisprudence, being less general
than metaphysics, and standing in empirical relation to it, can never be de-
duced from it.
With respect to the rejection of (2), if metaphysics has no important rele-
vance to jurisprudence, then what reason is there to believe that it has rele-
vance to anything else? It will have to take not only what jurisprudence has
to give, but also what science, psychology, etc., has to give. This means that
science could imply realism while jurisprudence implies nominalism, and so
on. To accept this possibility without holding that one of the studies is in
error, is to deny the validity of metaphysics, and the real existence of truth.
Jurisprudence is an important topic, and if metaphysics has no relevance to
it, so much the worse for metaphysics, which then becomes an insignificant
study. I see no reason to believe this, and many overwhelming reasons to
doubt it.
So much for (a). We now come to (b). Let us see where we are, at this
point We have rejected both (1) and (2). But if we can devise a third
alternative not thus far described, it may be that we can discover the true rela-
tion between jurisprudence and metaphysics. We have asserted that juris-
prudence has real independence of metaphysics but that metaphysics has im-
portant relevance to it. This brings us, quite easily as it seems to me, to a
third possibility. (3) Jurisprudence can develop independently of meta-
physics but must submit its conclusions to metaphysics. Metaphysics, in
other words, cannot dictate the right path to jurisprudence which must find
its own way; but metaphysics can point out when the wrong path has been
taken. Its control is negative.
Yntema sees in my remarks the shades of an old controversy with MI.R.
Cohen. Let me hasten to disabuse him of the notion that I am setting up my-
self, or my metaphysics as an absolute authority. I see in his remarks, simi-
larly the shades of an old controversy; one which I have had elsewhere with
neo-Thomism. I maintain the superior claim of metaphysics over juris-
prudence so far as the foundations and conclusions, and even method, of
jurisprudence are concerned. But I deny the authority of my own claim as a
metaphysician, or even of my own metaphysics, to any absolute authority
whatsoever. What I say is merely my opinion with respect to metaphysics;
no one and nothing gives me final authority. This is what the neo-Thomist
metaphysicians cannot understand about themselves and their positions. I
cannot speak for metaphysics beyond my capacity as an humble seeker after
the metaphysical truth; in which capacity I criticize jurisprudence. If, there-
fore, Yntema were criticizing me, or my metaphysics, I could yield. But if
he is challenging the authority of metaphysics itself, I cannot.
In conclusion, then, jurisprudence should develop its theories independently
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of metaphysics, but must be ready to submit its conclusions to that tribunal.
For inasmuch as jurisprudence has meaning beyond its own field, it has rela-
tions which involve external theoretical considerations. In this latter field,
metaphysics, alone, is competent to judge.
From Y to H August 12, 1941
I have your exiguous letter of the 6th, enclosing further comment by your
philosophical friend. What extraordinary patience, what logical solicitude are
therein exhibited? Incidentally, I note your remark about being driven into
a corner; it has, to repeat an expression recently used by an eccentric ac-
quaintance, a "slant" that engenders suspicions. Among, them is the thought
that you may be having me on, that your quondam "friend" may be one of
your alter egos, a quibblesome Mr. Hyde.
The comment is obviously painstaking and interesting. Among other
things, the ground has apparently been shifted from the issue whether meta-
physics is superior to jurisprudence to whether it has important relevance for
jurisprudence. I say "apparently," since metaphysics is also ascribed superior
claims "so far as the foundations and conclusions, and even the method, of
jurisprudence are concerned." This limits rather stringently the further con-
cession that jurisprudence can develop independently-which is perhaps more
significant.
I also find a little comfort in the suggestion that the claim of a particular
metaphysician and even of his metaphysics to final authority (though such is
asserted for "metaphysics itself") is denied. From which I deduce that the
same may apply to any other particular metaphysical system. From which I
further deduce that metaphysics is something like the Holy Grail.
Thus, I come to the reflection that we have wandered somewhat afield from
the affairs of jurisprudence. For, on the assumption that it is proper for
jurisprudence to develop independently of metaphysics (an assumption that
I am disposed to accept for the purposes of argument, even if a bit unfairly,
for the reason that it lines up with my predisposition in the matter), the ques-
tion of the possible relations between metaphysics and jurisprudence would
seemto be distinctively the concern of metaphysics. This would cast upon
metaphysics the burden of showing its pertinence to jurisprudence. Which
brings us precisely to where we started in this correspondence.
This is too brusque a conclusion, and, anyhow, I should not wish silence
with respect to this latest comment to allow the supposition that I have
granted or assumed what I did not. So, I crave your indulgence for a few
brief comments in response to the argument of your "friend," offered by way
of appendix to the above. They relate to the nature of the demonstration of-
fered to determine the relation of metaphysics to jurisprudence, more specifi-
cally to its formality.
First, bearing in mind that it is entirely possible for a proposition to be
false, in whole or in part, as well as true, in whole or in part, I must confess
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that the analysis suggested does not have on me the conviction of an axiom.
For one thing, it is predicated upon the assumption that, of two divergent
views, at least one must be partially in error. As to this, difficulties rush to
mind. For example, suppose two propositions with regard to the same sub-
ject matter, e.g., a quantum of water, the one, "This water is hot," the other,
"This water is cold." Now, how is it possible to say that, of these two propo-
sitions, one must necessarily be partially in error, since they may both be true
(or false, or partly so) from their respective frames of reference? This
seems to me an entirely possible analogy to the situation with respect to meta-
physics and jurisprudence. It may be quite appropriate for the jurist to re-
gard metaphysics as having about as much relevance to legal inquiry as, let
us say, religious beliefs, to seek to obviate biases therefrom derived if such
matters cannot be quite excluded from his inquiry, and at the same time it
may be quite suitable for metaphysics, regarded as an examination of scien-
tific methods, to assume that legal method is comprized within its subject mat-
ter. In other words, it seems to me entirely possible that two contradictory
and apparently mutually exclusive propositions about the relevance of meta-
physics to jurisprudence, or vice versa, are both at once tenable.
Second, allow me to refuse the position imputed to me that the relations
betveen metaphysics and jurisprudence must be resolved into two alternatives,
(i) that jurisprudence is dependent upon metaphysics or (ii) that jurispru-
dence develops independently of metaphysics. (Why should your metaphysi-
cal counsel, producing a tertium quid, limit his arguee to a dichotomy?) The
reason why this analysis appears to me unsatisfactory is in part suggested
above, but in addition it seems to me insufficiently exhaustive, even as a state-
ment of the logical possibilities, for other reasons than those adumbrated by
your philosophical adviser. In addition to the possible relations enumerated
in his advice, one might suggest by way of instance, (iii) metaphysics is de-
pendent on jurisprudence, (iv) jurisprudence and metaphysics are interde-
pendent (which my last letter suggested as a possible position, if metaphysics
be defined as including the pure theory of law), (v) the relations are par-
tially dependent and partially independent, in what respects to be further
ascertained, (vi) the relation is one of function, coincidence, or whatnot, and
not specifically of dependence, or (vii) we are talking about the relation of
an undefined quid to an undefinable quiddity. And doubtless other possibili-
ties, worthy of contemplation from a merely logical or postulational point of
view, might be adduced. I adduce these, not as a reductio ad absurdum of the
analysis in question, but to suggest that the factors of which it takes account
are inadequate.
This leads me in the third place to a question which seems immediately
pertinent to our discussion, namely, what is metaphysics for? I can see a pos-
sible function for metaphysics, as once suggested by Bertrand Russell, compar-
able to those of art or religion, namely, to satisfy the human instinct or ac-
quired habit of abstract speculation. I can also see a real service that might
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be rendered by a comparative study of the varied types of human intellectua-
tion, an effort to correlate and synthesize the methods and techniques in the
varied branches of knowledge. This latter species of investigation might re-
veal anomalies in juristic theory as contrasted with those followed in other
fields and thus lead to further critical inquiry. But, in either event and if only
because it is somewhat remote, it would seem that metaphysics would not be
in position to control the issues of particular scientific studies; to do so, it
would have to become jurisprudence or science, etc. At most, it would seem
to be in a position to suggest, either "Here is something which pleases or does
not please my system of abstractions" or "Here is something similar to, or
dissimilar from, what has been developed in another branch of knowledge."
All this suggests that, to demonstrate the relevance of metaphysics to juris-
prudence, it is needful to indicate in some detail just how metaphysics can
contribute to-or control-the results of a juristic study of a legal problem.
Nota bene: I say not that metaphysics is irrelevant to jurisprudence; only
that the burden is on those who assert its relevance to define just what the
legal scholar must look to metaphysics for in the pursuit of his work.
Perhaps an example will suggest more fully what I am trying to say.
Here, for example, is the doctrine of Erie RR. v. Tompkins, which I suppose
it would be considered appropriate for a legal student to investigate. He might
try to ascertain what the existent doctrine in a Holmesian sense is, or to de-
termine what it ought to be. The question is in what immediate or significant
respects, in addressing himself to such a matter, should the jurist also ex-
amine his metaphysical presuppositions in terms of realism, nominalism, etc,?
It is obvious that we need light on this matter, if metaphysics is relevant to
jurisprudence in any such sense as your friend supposes. And, in default
thereof, the only practical hypothesis for our jurist to take as a working as-
sumption, is that formal metaphysics is no more relevant to his science than
Protestantism. There may be all kinds of relations, but there is no indication
that they have practical significance for the job in hand.
If I may indulge in a final observation, it is that the enclosure in your let-
ter illustrates an attitude that I have seen exhibited on other occasions in
metaphysical circles, namely, the apparent conviction that metaphysics is not
sufficient in and of itself, that its very vocation must collapse, if its claims e.g.,
to control jurisprudence, should prove untenable. I have at times wondered
about this and about the apparent concern of some philosophers to convince
their adversaries of the error of their premises, a motive that is also evident
in the enclosure. Is there underlying such attitudes a basic source of uncer-
tainty? Or is there inherent in metaphysical speculation an 6lan argumcntatif,
a lust for argument which implies that a metaphysics can prove itself only by
producing conviction? If so, I would suggest, as I did with respect to Mr.
C.'s scheme for a synoptic legal philosophy that would eliminate the differ-
ences of jurisprudence, that it would seem most desirable to have divergent
views, since otherwise there would be no scope for argument.
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This is a long and, I fear, a tiresome letter. Forgive me. I shall be as
Catonic as you are, in my next.
From H to Y September 2, 1941
Here is the latest communication of my philosopher friend. Internal evi-
dence, if not the ideas, should long ago have satisfied you that I am not the
author. I am beginning to think my book was written in vain. I asked the
author of the letters, as you will observe from his first paragraph, if I could
reveal his identity. The answer is apparently no. Some day, however, I
hope to bring the two of you together. He is not a Washingtonian and your
visits in the past have never coincided with his. Otherwise, I would have
brought you both together. He is, however, a full-fledged professional phil-
osopher with a row of books to his credit (or discredit if you don't like meta-
physics).
(cndosure) August 25, 1941
I have your letter of August 15th together with the enclosure from Yntema.
Contrary to his suspicions, I do exist, although not for Descartes' reasons.
Although I am sure that I exist, you need not tell him who I am, since that is
the part I am not so sure of myself. There is one clue, however. I remember
slipping on the pavement when I was about fourteen, and falling on my head
so that I was unconscious for several minutes. When I awoke I did not
know what time it was, and ever since then I have been writing poetry.
But now to get on with Yntema's letter. I can see no conflict or restriction
between the right of jurisprudence to develop independently of metaphysics
and its duty to submit its findings to metaphysics. The fact that jurispru-
dence may be governed by a higher principle does not control it in its develop-
ment, does not, for instance, keep it from straying from the truth at times.
Is it not better to compare metaphysics to the Kingdom of God than to the
Holy Grail? It is within you-whoever and (far more important) whatever
you are, animal, vegetable or mineral, as we used to say in our parlor games.
Good, we agree, then, that jurisprudence can develop independently of
metaphysics, yet I cannot admit that this casts the burden of the possible re-
lations between jurisprudence and metaphysics upon metaphysics. My son is
free to develop independently of me but must submit his decisions to me.
And to the extent to which he is free to develop independently, this does not
put the burden of the necessity for our agreement on me but rather on him.
Again, I am free to develop independently of my country's laws, within limits,
but this does not put the burden of my agreements with those laws upon my
country; on the contrary.
Let me at this point record an aside, in the hope that it will clear up some-
thing. Metaphysics, in my view, is a higher science; jurisprudence a lower.
"Higher" and "lower" often imply a value-connotation of better and worse,
which is not intended here. Higher does not mean better; and lower, worse.
Higher means more theoretical; lower means more empirical. I do not hold
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metaphysics to be better than jurisprudence. I simply mean that it is more
theoretical. And this kind of relation is relative, but absolute given the frame
of reference. For example, jurisprudence is theoretical compared with the
more empirical practice of law.
But to continue: In a sense we may say that jurisprudence is not related to
metaphysics but rather it is metaphysics-the metaphysics of law. One can-
not escape from metaphysics simply by escaping from metaphysicians.
Unfortunately, I cannot admit Yntema's refutation of my axiom of contra-
diction. He argues that of the two propositions, "This water is cold" and
-I"This water is hot," "how is it possible to say that one must necessarily be
partially in error, since they both may be true (or false, or partly so) from
their respective frames of reference ?" I am not aware that I did. I said that
this applied to two contradictory propositions on the same level of analysis.
(See my letter of July 29, first paragraph). It is absurd to suppose, and out-
side all the logic I have ever read, that two particular propositions can be con-
tradictory. Moreover, I have never heard of two positive propositions being
considered contradictory. The contradictory of "This water is cold" is "This
water is not-cold." Two requirements of contradictory propositions are that
one of them must be universal and one negative. Cold and hot are not con-
tradictories; they are contraries.
Quite logically, just as Yntema's argument (second paragraph on page two
of his letter of August 12) follows from the above, mine does, too. He says,
so to speak, that there are not only hot and cold, but also warm, etc., in his
additional alternatives of i-vi. But the original propositions that I submitted
were contradictories; his new ones are contraries. I said in effect that with
respect to the dependence of jurisprudence upon metaphysics, either juris-
prudence is dependent upon metaphysics, or jurisprudence is not dependent
upon metaphysics. Their is no third alternative to a contradiction; all other
alternatives require their own contradictories.
This question in general seems to Yntema to lead him to another one, and
he asks, "what is metaphysics for?" I feel here a certain inflection and sus-
pect that he meant to add "anyhow," and that thig question comes as a cry
from the heart rather than as a question from the head. He seems to like
Russell's answer, that metaphysics satisfies the human instinct for abstract
speculation, or, in other words, that metaphysics satisfies the instinct for
metaphysics, rather a circular solution, and hardly suggestive of anything ex-
cept the amusing picture of Russell revolving rapidly (as he often does) upon
his own axis. His last book suggests that he is not content with his own
scuttling of his own ship. Yntema's elucidation of Russell's definition sug-
gests that he, too, regards metaphysics as something inside the minds of meta-
physicians. If it were nothing more than that I could feel as Yntema must
that perhaps metaphysicians are meddling when they consider the metaphysi-
cal role of jurisprudence. This is a view which implies subjective idealism.
But I doubt whether Yntema feels the same way about jurisprudence, for
example. I'll venture that he holds jurisprudence to have some real relevance
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to the actual world (which it no doubt has), and not merely to be the private
thoughts of legal theorists. If he believes this, too, then of course he is a
nominalist with respect to philosophy and a realist with respect to jurispru-
dence. We all frequently do that but surely it is inconsistent. But here I
may be arguing unfairly for Yntema.
I wish that I could state briefly the role of metaphysics, what metaphysics
"is for." It would require many volumes. I am not here avoiding a chal-
lenge: I have done it in several volumes myself. Certainly, however, although
I am unfamiliar with the doctrine of Eric R. R. v. Tompkins, I suspect that
metaphysics would be of little service here. Any doctrine argued by induc-
tion from a single instance must either be or not be consistent with the sys-
tem of law under which it is an instance. Metaphysics can tell us nothing
about this, about the subsumption of either particular cases or of general laws
under laws still more general. This is for logic to aid in solving; not for
metaphysics to solve.
As to Yntema's last arguments, that metaphysicians betray a "basis of un-
certainty" and a "lust for argument," I cannot answer them; with due respect
and in all sincerity I can only plead guilty. It is true that I am uncertain;
would that all metaphysicians were. Peirce once gave his blessing to the
critic who accused him of not being absolutely sure of his own position. As
to the lust for argument, was not this the guilt of Socrates?
From Y to H January 8, 1942
First, a note about the enclosure from your Socratic friend, which I have
again looked through. It seems to me that we are still, as it were, looking at
each other through peepholes or, to change the metaphor, we are struggling
in the spiderwebs of words. So be it-I accept the proposition that there can
be but one alternative contradicting a universal proposition. But this scarcely
goes to the point that I was trying-vainly it would seem-to make, namely,
that the relation between jurisprudence and metaphysics cannot properly be so
analyzed. Or, to put it another way, the suggestion that jurisprudence is de-
pendent on metaphysics seems to me a positive statement, quite analogous to
the proposition that water is hot, and therefore liable to a number of contrary
alternatives.
I think that I should add this. I have been genuinely interested in learning
(perhaps too like Socrates) what significance metaphysics may have for ju-
risprudence in the very practical sense of ascertaining what aids or controls
metaphysics may provide in the study of legal problems. This much I have
thought it not unjust to ask of a professional metaphysicist who suggests that
metaphysics is higher than jurisprudence. I gather that it is appropriate for
jurisprudence to proceed independently, subject to visitation from the higher
realm of metaphysics. This doesn't seem to me to give me the crumb of bread
I was looking for, but I am content.
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